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Abstract
Growing intra-party pluralism and intensiﬁed factional rivalry have pres-
sured the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to adjust the 
authoritarian ofﬁcial-selection system by resorting to an 'intra-Party democ-
racy' mechanism based on informal polls among inﬂuential party ofﬁcials and 
retirees. The progress, albeit slow and opaque since the 17th Party Congress 
in 2007, is increasingly seen as the CPC's only solution to intensiﬁed factional 
rivalry at various levels and the decline of legitimacy associated with the cor-
rupt and inept ofﬁcialdom. With backroom straw polls setting new norms 
for the CPC to settle factional inﬁghting over power transfer at the 18th Party 
Congress, this intra-party democracy procedure has been gradually routi-
nized at both the central and local levels to make the appointment process 
more consultative and to fend off democratic outcries from the public. In the 
past few years, cautious but substantial experiments with contested polls 
have been introduced by CPC's organizational departments to the monolithic 
political system, in which key party/government ofﬁcials are facing increas-
ingly competitive voting tests before they can be promoted to higher levels.
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Introduction
The term 'intra-Party democracy,' which appeared in the Communist 
Party of China's (CPC) documents as early as the 8th Party Congress in 
1956 and has been reiterated by all the Party Congresses since the end of 
the Cultural Revolution (Qian 2012), to a large extent has been political 
rhetoric aired by the CPC leadership with no substantive signiﬁcance. 
However, the 17th Party Congress, on the eve of which Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang reportedly had been selected as heirs apparent from a backroom 
straw poll among party tycoons, demarcated the start of a new period 
when the CPC had to adjust its authoritarian ofﬁcial-selection system 
by relying more on informal polls and consultations inside the Party.1 
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Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, albeit having more political room to manoeu-
ver in their second term following the 17th Party Congress, were stalled 
by a spate of unexpected disasters, events and strong vested interests 
from making substantial progress in pushing forward political reform. 
Nevertheless, to assume that intra-party democracy still remains a hol-
low rhetorical formulation risks overlooking dynamic and potentially 
far-reaching changes within the CPC (Li 2009). Among various adaptive 
measures the CPC has taken in response to the decay of organizational 
apparatus and a decline of legitimacy, the move towards intra-party 
democracy may be the most conspicuous approach for the top leader-
ship to remain ﬂexible and resilient by making the promotion process 
more meritocratic and consultative. Since 2007, as part of the CPC's re-
institutionalization process that succeeded in producing 'authoritarian 
resilience' (Nathan 2003: 6-17), intra-party democracy has been put into 
concrete action in a manageable way to encourage elite competition 
inside the CPC and alleviate public pressure for general democracy.
Leadership succession at the top level and the more regular mid-ca-
reer ofﬁcial selection are vital organizational issues for the effectiveness 
and longevity of the Leninist one-party control of the country. Intra-
party democracy, which is being gradually formalized, routinizes the 
competitive balloting system within the Party and moralizes the CPC's 
power monopoly in the face of an increasingly pluralistic society.  It is 
essentially a mixture of political façade being built by the CPC to fend 
off democratic outcries as well as cautious but substantial experiments 
in introducing contested elections to the monolithic political system. This 
article examines major steps the CPC has been taking during the inter-
val between the 17th and 18th Party Congress to promote intra-party 
democracy, to assess the merits and constraints of screening out eligible 
ofﬁcials through contested but manageable polls within the Party.  
The 'Intra-Party Democracy' Story at the 17th Party 
Congress  
The CPC is the only party that organizes political life in China, and 
power succession is the agenda with the highest priority for every party 
leadership. Without transparent institutions for leadership change as in a 
democracy, the Chinese leadership has to ﬁnd other means to cope with 
the succession issue. Succession has been affecting the country's politi-
cal stability since the establishment of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949. Mao Zedong ruled China for several decades, when bitter 
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political struggles that resulted from power succession occurred and 
plunged the country into chaos, as in the case of his appointed succes-
sors Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao (Rush 1974; Liu 1976). After returning to 
power, Deng Xiaoping, a victim of Mao's personal dictatorship, realized 
the importance of institutionalized power succession. However, power 
succession during the Deng era also did not go smoothly, as evidenced 
by the ousting of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang by irregular political 
means. Afterwards, both Jiang Zemin's paramount leadership and Hu 
Jintao's heir apparent status were conﬁrmed, based on Deng's unchal-
lengeable political authority. With the passing of the older generation of 
leaders, the issue of power succession becomes increasingly important. 
Since China's new leaders lack the personal and autocratic power that 
their old counterparts shared based on their revolutionary experience, 
they have to build up new power bases by discovering new rules and 
methods. Hu Jintao, like his predecessor Jiang Zemin, could not dic-
tate his own successor, so he had to appeal to other means in handling 
power succession.
 It was reported that prior to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the 
CPC Central Organization Department held a tentative election among 
ofﬁcials at the provincial/ministerial level and above, asking them to 
vote on candidates for Politburo Standing Committee members. Over 
400 people, including members and alternate members of the 16th 
CPC Central Committee and leading ofﬁcials of relevant departments, 
participated in picking proposed members of the Politburo from a list 
of almost 200 candidates. Hu Jintao presided over the event, on behalf 
of the CPC Central Committee, and set the conditions for the new 
Politburo members, with emphasis on political ﬁrmness, capacity and 
image among Party members and ordinary people. The candidates had 
to be 63 years or younger and in a position at least at the ministerial 
level, according to the rules.2 Xi Jinping got the most votes, followed 
by Li Keqiang, He Guoqiang and Zhou Yongkang (Duowei 2007: 2). 
For the purpose of political stability, Hu and other leaders accepted the 
election results, implying that votes are important in deciding future 
leaders of the Party. Meng Jianzhu, who also obtained quite a number 
of votes during the process, was promoted from the obscure position 
of Jiangxi party secretary to the vice-premier-level State Councillor and 
authoritative Minister of Public Security. Hu was quoted as saying that 
the 'democratic recommendation' of the new Party leadership is of great 
importance for the CPC,3 which has over 70 million members and is 
managing a country with a population of 1.3 billion. 
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While one still does not know what actually happened to the so-called 
'democratic process of electing the party leadership', it is true that for 
the ﬁrst time the participants of the Central Committee's plenary session 
could impact the selection of Politburo members. The authority thus 
regarded this event as a milestone in the history of the Party's efforts 
to develop internal democracy. Political struggles for power succession 
had troubled the CPC leadership since the birth of the CPC, and since 
now no single leader dictates the power succession, new institutions 
and methods, including ones with democratic elements, have to be 
instituted. As indicated in the title of the report, this is for the stability 
of the Party and the state. Therefore, despite its opaqueness and lack of 
supervision, the intra-party 'election' still helped to change the rules of 
the game on the succession issue and became an important step to push 
forward intra-party democracy. For years China has been attempting 
grass-roots elections and democracy at the village and township levels 
with caution, but the unexpected trial at the top level changed the bot-
tom-up conception of China's political reforms.
 Actually, the CPC is trying to combine the mechanisms of elec-
tion and consultation with certain formal and informal criteria to be 
followed when selecting future top leaders. The former Chinese vice-
president Zeng Qinghong reportedly revealed the ﬁve criteria set by 
the Politburo Standing Committee in 2002 for choosing future leaders.4 
According to Zeng, the Standing Committee had solicited the advice 
of former Politburo members on the candidate lists worked out on the 
basis of the ﬁve criteria. After 12 rounds of discussion and evaluation, 
the Standing Committee ﬁnally worked out a ﬁve-person list including 
Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Ling Jihua, Xi Jinping and Li Yuanchao. Zeng 
not only mentioned the polls inside the Politburo, in which Xi and Li 
got almost the same number of votes, but also noted that the Politburo 
ﬁnally solicited opinions from retired leaders such as Wan Li, Jiang 
Zemin, Song Ping, Qiao Shi and Liu Huaqing, most of whom suggested 
Xi would be more suitable.
Such an intra-party 'democratic assessment' (minzhu pingyi) mecha-
nism through voting and consultation has been expanding to a wider 
range. Before the annual session of the National People's Congress in 
March 2008, candidates for new state, parliamentary and cabinet lead-
ers all went through such scrutiny starting in November 2007. The CPC 
Secretariat sent out candidate lists and questionnaires to local provincial 
leaders, soliciting their opinions on high-level personnel arrangements. 
Such a procedure has gradually been institutionalized and expanded to 
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various provincial-level regions to select candidates for local leadership 
positions since the 17th Party Congress. 
The political capital of Chinese paramount leaders since the founding 
of the PRC in 1949 has been diminishing with each generation. A farewell 
to strongman politics has pushed China's leadership structure forward 
in an increasingly power-sharing direction that facilitates intra-party 
consultations, bargaining and even secret polls behind closed doors. The 
weaker the top leader is, the more he will rely on 'collective decision-
making' (jiti juece) when appointing successors and enacting national 
strategies. Certain informal rules and institutions based on balance of 
power among different factions and the restriction of top leaders' power 
have entered China's elite politics. This ensures that candidateship of 
future successors is not solely a reﬂection of the incumbent top leader's 
own will, but an outcome of compromises among different groups, and 
one step further, the result of polls in a limited range. This way of pro-
ducing future leadership guarantees policy continuation and stability 
while forestalling individual dictatorship. 
More Polls at the Local Level
When the CPC was reshufﬂing thousands of Party committee secretar-
ies and members of the Party committees at various levels before the 
18th Party Congress, three municipalities in the eastern part of Jiangsu 
Province made changes to the non-transparent selection process by 
introducing contested elections to select top Party leaders. As an ex-
perimental move towards intra-party democracy, Wuxi, Nantong and 
Suqian cities in Jiangsu Province for the ﬁrst time in history nominated 
a total of 1,127 candidates for the three Party secretary positions. After 
going through two rounds of screening by two panels of provincial-rank 
cadres based in Jiangsu, the list was narrowed down to six candidates. 
Members of the Standing Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial Party 
Committee then balloted and the three with the highest votes became 
the Party secretaries of the three cities.5
The new selection mechanism, called 'open recommendations and 
balloting' (gongtuipiaojue), was supported by Li Yuanchao, then Jiangsu-
born director of the powerful CPC Organization Department in charge 
of cadre promotion and demotion. Li was promoted to vice-president 
of China in 2013. Observers viewed the balloting within the Provincial 
Party Committee as a promising sign of introducing more competitive 
procedures into the selection of city-level ofﬁcials. China started direct 
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village elections in 1988; now almost every village in China—home to 
some 600 million farmers—is required to hold direct elections regularly 
for a new village committee vested with the power to decide important 
issues such as land and property rights. However, since village commit-
tees are formally excluded from China's ﬁve-level governmental appa-
ratus (central, provincial, municipal, county and township), and more 
villagers are settling down in urban areas, such grass-roots elections can 
only play a limited role in China's democratization. Semi-competitive 
elections have moved to the township level, with increasing experimen-
tation especially since 1998, in places like Lingshan in Sichuan Province, 
Caiji in Jiangsu Province6 and Dapeng in Guangdong Province.7 From 
late 2001 to early 2002, about 2,000 townships in Sichuan Province im-
plemented semi-competitive elections (Lai 2004).8  
Meanwhile, bribery and violence have degraded grass-roots elec-
tions of the Party's branches and the villagers' self-governing bodies. 
According to an investigation conducted by provincial prosecutors, the 
heads of more than half of the 18 villages or communities in Longquan 
township of Haikou City, Hainan Province, were elected after buying 
votes or feting voters. In some cases, local hooligans and gangsters 
intimidated villagers to vote for particular candidates.9
After years of experimentation, the Chinese authorities are still 
reluctant to promulgate semi-competitive elections for Party/govern-
ment positions above the township level.10 Due to the slow progress in 
promoting elections, Wang Yukai, a professor from the China National 
School of Administration, has urged the Party-state to select county 
leaders through intra-party balloting.11 To bring political reforms in line 
with economic reform in China, the Party is trying to rely more on the 
contested intra-party balloting system than the opaque one-candidate-
one-position appointment process to select high-rank cadres. However, 
the Party has not deviated much from its traditional way of selecting 
cadres. Selection is still largely based on meritocracy and loyalty rather 
than democracy. Competitive elections are means and not an end to 
help the Party single out capable and loyal ofﬁcials for important posi-
tions, and exclusive elections are just a part of the Party's complicated 
system of cadre selection based on meritocratic principles and political 
integrity. As a result, Jiangsu's experimentation with a more transparent 
and more competitive process to reshufﬂe local leadership did not yield 
any surprises. The Party's favourite candidates still emerged winners in 
the elections and the entire process is still controlled by the provincial 
Party committee.  
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Mao Xiaoping from Wuxi, Ding Dawei from Nantong and Miao 
Ruilin from Suqian were all mayors in their respective cities and their 
challengers also held key positions in the provincial Party committee. 
Going from mayor to municipal Party secretary is the norm in China's 
politics. Meanwhile the comprehensive process used in Jiangsu Province 
is not mandatory and local authorities can opt not to follow it.
Nevertheless, Jiangsu's reform was clear evidence of the Party's will 
to promote openness and competition and to implement contested elec-
tions (cha'e xuanju) in cadre selection. The CPC has been making slow 
but continuous progress in expanding 'cha'e xuanju,' as members of the 
18th CPC Central Committee were elected with a 9.3 per cent margin, 
higher than the 7.7 per cent at the 17th Party Congress.12
Besides Jiangsu, other places such as Beijing city and Zhejiang 
Province have also made similar changes to the selection process of 
department chiefs. Beijing, Zhejiang, Hunan, Jiangxi and Guangdong 
have opened up high-level civil vacancies to a broad range of qualiﬁed 
candidates who need to go through exams, interviews and balloting 
before they can be appointed to their respective positions. 
'Democratic Recommendation':  
CPC's System of Selecting Cadres
The objective of cadre selection reform, an indispensable move to fulﬁl 
'intra-party democracy,' is to make sure that professionally competent 
people are recruited and promoted, and that they remain loyal to the 
CPC's ideologies and political views (Brødsgaard 2001). All Party and 
government ofﬁcials are managed by the Party according to detailed 
regulations relating to recruitment, appointment, transfer, reward, 
training, etc. (CPC Central Organization Department and the Ministry 
of Personnel 2008), which supplement the Civil Service Law. Concern-
ing the management of cadres above the county/division level (xianchu 
ji), the most important provisions are contained in the 'Regulation on 
Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres' 
(dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli) issued in 2002 
by the CPC Organization Department. 
All these regulations emphasize that when selecting and appointing 
leading cadres in the Chinese civil service system, a number of basic 
principles including openness, equality, competition and the selection 
of the best must be adhered to. Although selection and appointment are 
based on meritocratic principles (ren ren wei xian), cadres should also 
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have both political integrity and ability (de cai jian bei) and are ultimately 
managed by the Party (dang guan gan bu) (CPC Central Organization 
Department 2002: Article 2). Civil servants to be promoted to leading 
Party and government posts at section (village)-head level are required 
to have at least a college diploma (dazhuan) and have worked at the 
deputy post for more than two years (CPC Central Organization De-
partment and the Ministry of Personnel 2008: Article 19). Candidates 
to be promoted to posts higher than the county (division) level must 
have held at least two posts at lower level organs; candidates who are 
promoted from a deputy post to a head post (zhengzhi) generally must 
have worked at the deputy post for more than two years (CPC Central 
Organization Department 2002: Article 7). Leading cadres at the bureau 
level (ju, si, ting) or above should have at least a bachelor's degree (daxue 
benke) (CPC Central Organization Department 2002: Article 7).
Candidates to be considered for selection and appointment to leading 
posts should be proposed through the so-called democratic recommen-
dation process (minzhu tuijian) (CPC Central Organization Department 
2002: Articles 10-19) conducted by the Party committee at the same level, 
or by a higher-level organization or personnel department. At the time of 
an ofﬁcial's change of term, various people and personnel are consulted, 
including Party committee members, leading members of government 
organs, leading members of the discipline inspection commissions and 
people's courts, and leading members of lower-level Party committees 
and governments. Members of democratic parties and representatives 
of groups without Party afﬁliation will also be consulted. 
A candidate who has been nominated will have to undergo evaluation 
(kaocha) (CPC Central Organization Department 2002: Articles 20-28) 
based on elaborate procedures, which may include interviews with a 
number of leading ofﬁcials in his or her own department. Evaluations 
are held throughout the ofﬁcial term. Leading members of Party com-
mittees and government departments are also evaluated in the middle 
of their term. Any promotion or dismissal arising from the evaluations 
must undergo a process of deliberation (yunniang) and be reported to 
the Party committee at the higher level.
The regulations require a two-thirds quorum of members of a given 
committee when appointment or dismissal of cadres is involved. The 
regulations include details concerning job transfer. Any leading member 
of a local Party committee or government who has served in the same 
post for ten years must be transferred to a new post. The Party has 
worked out a new plan for 'deepening the cadre management system' 
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covering the 2010–2020 period (CPC Central Organization Department 
2009). The plan further details and expands the provisions of the 2002 
regulations, which are applicable to the entire cadre corps and not just 
leading cadres. The plan, with an emphasis on 'democratic recommen-
dation', 'public opinion polls' and 'contested elections' (cha'e xuanju), is 
a reﬂection of the preoccupation of China's leadership with selecting 
qualiﬁed cadres. The focus of this theme goes back to October 2004, when 
former vice-president Zeng Qinghong published an important article in 
the People's Daily, in which he stressed the importance of strengthening 
the Party's governing capacity. Zeng discussed the 'painful lesson of the 
loss of power' by the communist parties in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe.13 He attributed the collapse of the Soviet Communist 
Party to the rigidness and inﬂexibility of its governing system, which 
ultimately led to the Party's diminishing capacity to govern. To Zeng, 
establishing clear rules and regulations and ensuring constant cadre 
renewal were necessary to attract new talent. 
Growing Pluralism inside the CPC
The transformation of the CPC has been very rapid. Since no opposi-
tion party is allowed, entering into the political process of the CPC is 
the most efﬁcient way for social groups to express their interests. To a 
large extent, the 'three represents'14 proposed by the CPC in the early 
2000s typically reﬂected its realistic perception that the CPC has to rep-
resent different social interests (Zheng 2004: 253-281). Since the reform 
and opening up, the most obvious change in the Chinese society is the 
rise of the middle class (Li 2010). The number of Chinese middle class, 
including private entrepreneurs, is not large, but they have already 
demonstrated very strong demand for political participation. This is 
why the ruling party has kept pace with the times by not only providing 
constitutional protection to non-state-owned sectors, including private 
enterprises, but also allowing and encouraging private entrepreneurs 
to join the ruling party.
Behind the 'three represents' are various social and economic inter-
ests. To represent different social interests requires the CPC to be open 
to including different social interests into one political process. The 
change in the nature of party members is an indicator. In the Maoist 
era, workers, peasants and the People's Liberty Army (PLA) constituted 
the majority of CPC membership; since the reform and opening up, 
intellectuals, professionals and the emerging middle class have made 
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up an increasing proportion of the party (Zheng 2010; Gore 2011). If the 
West practices 'external pluralism', the Chinese party system tends to 
be characterized by 'internal pluralism'. Different interests are 'internal-
ized' ﬁrst, that is, included in the existing system, to compete for and 
coordinate their interests within. After the successful incorporation 
of private entrepreneurs into the party and the political process, the 
CPC has begun to put emphasis on 'social management' to expand its 
ruling foundation by absorbing more social forces, which have gained 
signiﬁcantly in growth and development in the past decade. As the 
social base of the CPC enlarges, the demand for intra-party democracy 
has also increased. This is why the ruling party has been emphasizing 
the importance of intra-party democracy and searching for manifold 
inner-party democracy in recent years. 
China has refused to follow the path of Western democracy and has 
developed a unique system of power succession. This should be attrib-
uted to the late Deng Xiaoping after he returned to power in the late 
1970s. Deng was successful in establishing two related systems, one is 
the exit system for aged leaders, i.e., the retirement system; the other is 
the recruitment system to recruit talent from all levels of society. This 
system of power succession has been highly institutionalized from the 
grass roots to the highest leadership (Zheng 2005: 15-36). Compared 
with many other authoritarian regimes, the CPC has regularized the 
age limit for ofﬁcials at all levels, which facilitates elite succession and 
avoids the personal dictatorship from Mao's time. Now, in general, 
leaders including the general secretary of the CPC, the president of 
the state, premier and other important positions are allowed to serve 
at most two terms in ofﬁce, i.e., ten years. The term limit is an effec-
tive institutional constraint on personal dictatorship. That is to say, 
although China does not have a Western form of democracy, it has 
found another way of forestalling personal dictatorship. By contrast, 
in some developing countries, personal dictatorship is commonplace in 
both the monarchical countries and those with a modern party system. 
When a person or a family has ruled a country for several decades, the 
system is prone to malpractice and corruption, which are intolerable 
for the society.
The CPC's re-institutionalization effort since the late-1990s,15 which 
included civil service reform (Brødsgaard and Chen 2014: 77-99), rebuild-
ing of party cells and core groups (dangzu), more meritocratic promotions 
based on prudent personnel assessments (kaohe) and frequent anti-cor-
ruption campaigns,16 has managed to refresh inner-party politics at a 
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relatively faster pace, and thus reversed the trend of atrophy by making 
the Party more dynamic and efﬁcient. With rigid enforcement of the 
age limit and disciplinary inspections, there are thousands of ofﬁcials 
leaving their positions every year, with the same number of ofﬁcials 
assuming these positions. 
Besides the role in institutionalizing the succession process and 
preventing disruptive inner-party strife, intra-party democracy has 
another important task, namely, to remain sensitive and responsive to 
social demands. Even in Western multiparty democracies, the behav-
iour of individuals and ﬁrms in stable societies leads to the formation 
of dense networks of collusive, cartelistic, lobbying organizations that 
make economies less efﬁcient and dynamic and polities less govern-
able. The CPC that has been ruling China for more than six decades is 
now facing similar challenges from all kinds of vested interests within 
the system. The unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched by 
Xi Jinping, who himself was selected out of the intra-party democracy 
process, has shown that further reform is possible in energy, banking 
and media sectors where some entrenched vested interests have been 
eradicated in the anti-graft purge. 
Elections Lacking in China's Elite Selection
China traditionally adopted the examination and recommendation sys-
tem rather than competitive elections when selecting its ofﬁcials. During 
the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), most appointments in the imperial 
bureaucracy were based on recommendations by prominent aristocrats 
and local ofﬁcials. Recommended individuals were mostly from aris-
tocratic families. When the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD) established the 
imperial examination system in 605 AD, ancient China began to select 
most of its administrative ofﬁcials from among civilians through insti-
tutionalized imperial examinations. However, even during that period, 
bureaucratic appointments did not fully rely on examination results but 
sometimes upon the recommendation of powerful people.
This cultural heritage still has signiﬁcant impact upon today's Chinese 
politics, with the Party-state largely reliant on the civil service examina-
tions for recruiting grass-roots cadres and recommendations from politi-
cal elites of the Party committees at various levels for the promotion of 
ofﬁcials. In most cases, the Party secretary or the administrative chief 
(yibashou, or chief ofﬁcial of the organization) in the Party committee 
has the arbitrary power to make promotion decisions. 
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The non-transparent process of promoting ofﬁcials recommended by 
the yibashou has caused rampant, corrupt practices such as the selling 
and buying of government posts or bribing for higher positions. In one 
of China's largest 'selling ofﬁcial posts' scandals, Ma De, former Party 
secretary of Suihua City in Heilongjiang Province, was charged with 
taking bribes amounting to more than 6 million yuan (US$726,000) 
between 1992 and 2001. Most of the bribes were offered by ambitious 
county heads and leading ofﬁcials of government departments under 
Ma's jurisdiction. More than 260 government ofﬁcials were alleged to be 
involved in Ma's case, including Tian Fengshan, former minister of land 
and resources, and Han Guizhi, former chairwoman of the Heilongjiang 
Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC).17 
The recent increase in corruption cases involving ministerial/pro-
vincial-level ofﬁcials has raised concern over the selection criteria and 
procedures for senior ofﬁcials (Chen and Zhu 2009: 1-3). The scandals 
involving selling ofﬁcial posts have undermined the Party's promotion 
principle that cadres should have both political integrity and ability (de 
cai jian bei). This has also put the Party's reputation and legitimacy at 
stake. 
The Party issued its ﬁrst interim regulation on the selection and 
appointment of ofﬁcials in 1995, which included detailed procedures 
regarding nomination, screening, transferring, discipline and monitor-
ing; the regulation was revised into a formal statute in 2002. Although 
the institutionalization of elite management has introduced a number 
of mechanisms to curb arbitrary personnel decisions while enhancing 
the institutional dominance of the Party (Bo 2004: 99), the lack of com-
petitive elections throughout the system has made the ofﬁcial selection 
process less fair and transparent.  
China has institutionalized direct village elections in most parts of 
the country, but since village committees are formally excluded from 
China's ﬁve-level governmental apparatus, such grass-roots elections 
can only play a limited role in promoting democratization and ofﬁcials' 
accountability.  
Recent reports have revealed that the Party is encouraging polling 
within local Party committees to select county/district-level Party sec-
retaries. In June 2011, seven candidates from different government de-
partments competed for the Party secretary position of Yangxi County, 
Guangdong Province, by delivering speeches in front of over 100 voters 
from the upper-level Party Committee of the Yangjiang City. In 2008, 
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four counties and districts under Guiyang City, Guizhou Province, made 
their top positions of Party secretary open to qualiﬁed Party-member 
competitors, who had to go through contested polling within the mu-
nicipal Party committee in Guiyang.18  
The 18th Party Congress: A New Norm?
Although the Party itself is becoming more pluralistic, propelling its 
leadership structure towards an increasingly power-sharing direction 
that facilitates intra-party consultations, bargaining and closed-door 
polling, institutionalization of intra-party democracy is still weak and 
full of uncertainties. Constraints on institutionalization became evident 
when the CPC elite politics was moving from internal balloting before 
the 17th Party Congress to backroom dealing among factional repre-
sentatives on the eve of the 18th Party Congress. There was little doubt 
that Xi would succeed Hu as party chief in 2012, but Hu's handover 
of both party and military reins to Xi at the same time still surprised 
many as a new norm for future power transitions. The mandatory 
retirement system, an institutional premise for intra-party democracy 
ﬁrst advocated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, was strictly followed at 
the Politburo level during the 17th and 18th Party Congress, while Hu's 
complete retirement from party and military posts was a step further 
along the path. Unlike the semi-retirement of his predecessors, Jiang 
and the late Deng, both of whom had kept the top military post for a 
couple of years after leaving the Politburo, Hu's complete exit ostensi-
bly institutionalized a smoother power transition and made Xi a more 
formidable leader upon the start of his tenure.
Since behind-the-scenes jockeying for power and horse-trading had 
been extremely intense in the run-up to the long-planned power transi-
tion at the 18th Party Congress, the top leadership failed to select new 
members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee (PSC) through a 
large-scale intra-party poll as it did ﬁve years ago. China was plagued by 
political scandals and rumours since the Chongqing police chief, Wang 
Lijun, ﬂed to the US Consulate in Chengdu in February 2012, foreboding 
high-ﬂyer Bo Xilai's expulsion. Later, Ling Jihua, a close conﬁdante of 
Hu Jintao, lost his key position as chief of the CPC General Ofﬁce due 
to his son's death in a mysterious Ferrari car accident, dealing a blow to 
Hu, who was seeking to ﬁll important positions with his protégés before 
his retirement. On the eve of the 18th Party Congress, the new leader-
ship line-up was said to be decided by backroom straw polls among 
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inﬂuential party retirees and outgoing Politburo members (Reuters 
2012; Li 2012: 133-135), which may set new norms for the CPC to settle 
factional inﬁghting over power transfers based on such informal polls. 
Party elders prioritized seniority when handpicking the ﬁve newcom-
ers in the Politburo Standing Committee. All the newcomers will be 
older than 68 years in 2017 and will thus be replaced at the next party 
congress. Of the ﬁve, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Wang Qishan 
and Zhang Gaoli used to be formidable gross domestic product (GDP) 
promoters in coastal provinces while Liu Yunshan played hardball 
when he was director of the Central Propaganda Department. Of the 
ﬁve, all but one are considered protégés of retired leader Jiang Zemin.19 
Once-hopeful Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang failed to grab a seat in the 
PSC, the size of which was scaled down from nine to seven to enable 
power concentration at the top. 
Party elders, once formidable political players in deciding CPC's 
top leaders and policy directions in the 1980s, are continuing to play a 
vital role in inﬂuencing the outcome of high-level polls. Despite Hu's 
complete retirement, China's elite politics today is still affected by 
gerontocracy in which retired leaders who have no formal positions 
can continue to exercise substantial political inﬂuence through various 
informal ways behind the scenes.20 This was particularly true of Jiang 
Zemin who remained politically active on the eve of the 18th Party 
Congress that witnessed his protégés predominating over the Politburo 
and the PSC. The landslide victory won by the Jiang camp in the new 
PSC, however, does not necessarily mean that 'the winner takes all' in 
Chinese elite politics (Li 2013). In his ﬁrst year of ofﬁce, Xi surprisingly 
embarked on probes into retired Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou, Jiang's 
key protégés, breaking the immunity of PSC members and Central Mili-
tary Commission vice-presidents from corruption charges and chang-
ing the balance of power in a way that favours Hu's camp. Meanwhile, 
Hu's protégés are still well represented in other important leadership 
bodies such as the State Council, the CPC Secretariat and the Supreme 
People's Court (Li 2013). 
On the institutionalization of cadre selection, the Party's long-term 
goal is still meritocracy rather than democracy. The rampant bribery 
and violence that have characterized grass-roots elections of the Party's 
branches and the villagers' self-governing bodies have reminded the 
Party of the innate ﬂaws pertaining to popular elections. There have 
been greater dynamics for intra-party democracy after the passing of 
the strongman age. However, if intra-party competition is inevitable, 
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formal rules and norms that can regulate competition will be crucial. To 
eliminate the possibility of hidden rules, competition rules will have to 
be explicit, fair and transparent. While intra-party democracy has been 
practiced, there are hardly any formal rules and norms at the moment. 
When hidden rules dominate political competition, democracy will be 
jeopardized. If democracy is jeopardized, intra-party competition will 
not only destroy the unity of the party but also weaken the overall ability 
of the ruling party, thus increasing the risk for political instability. 
Will Xi Be the Game-changer?
President Xi Jinping emerged from the CPC's Third Plenum in Novem-
ber 2013 as the supreme authority, overseeing not only domestic secu-
rity and diplomatic issues, but also economic affairs. His omnipotent 
power over socio-economic policies, the military, domestic security 
issues, propaganda and foreign affairs through the establishment of the 
National Security Council and the Central Leading Group on Compre-
hensively Deepening Reforms has challenged the Party's mechanism 
of collective leadership and intra-party democracy. Xi is no longer the 
ﬁrst-among-equals in the Politburo Standing Committee. His assertive-
ness and power consolidation have altered the trajectory of top Chinese 
leaders who have witnessed diminishing political authority with each 
generation change. Xi brought back strongman politics, thus undermin-
ing the party's collective leadership mechanism where the power of a 
paramount leader is not absolute and is constrained by other Politburo 
Standing Committee members. 
Xi's charisma has impaired the lingering political inﬂuence of retired 
party elders such as Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Li Peng, in crucial 
policy and personnel decisions. A political conservative, Xi has shown 
little interest in democratizing the country, or in promoting intra-party 
democracy that will impair his ability to dictate future successors. At 
the cost of freedom of speech and intra-party power sharing, Xi's au-
thoritarian style is a precondition for bold economic reforms that run 
counter to vested interests, but may not be positive for the evolution of 
intra-party democracy. In this respect, the development of intra-party 
democracy still faces great uncertainty under Xi's tenure, but given the 
magnitude of China's multilayer bureaucratic system and economic 
scale, as well as the unstoppable growth of inner-Party pluralism, the 
top leadership still has to resort to established procedures based on 
closed-door consultation and contested polling when reshufﬂing of-
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ﬁcials in massive numbers.21 Even on the issue of next-round power 
succession, which will emerge at the 19th Party Congress, Xi will lack 
absolute power in hand-picking all the next-generation candidates to 
the elite Politburo Standing Committee. He may have the ﬁnal say in 
deciding the heir apparent that will replace him in 2022, but on other key 
positions in the Politburo Standing Committee, he still has to defer to 
backroom horse-trading, and on some occasions, informal polls among 
party tycoons. Even with his 'red nobility' parentage that endows him 
with self-conﬁdence and the mandate for handling thorny succession 
issues, Xi is expected to respect the existing formal and informal poli-
tics from which he himself has been selected as the top CPC leader. In 
another words, notwithstanding the seemingly unfettered power Xi has 
been enjoying compared to his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi's capacity to 
select future leaders will still be constrained by the embedded formal 
and informal Party institutions that prevent overwhelming domination 
of one faction, encourage factional accommodation and thus reduce 
destructive power struggles. 
Conclusion
Growing intra-party pluralism, intensiﬁed factional rivalry at various 
levels and the decline of legitimacy associated with the corrupt and inept 
ofﬁcialdom have pressured the CPC leadership to adjust the authoritar-
ian ofﬁcial-selection system by resorting to the 'intra-party democracy' 
mechanism based on informal polls among inﬂuential Party ofﬁcials 
and retirees. The progress, albeit slow and opaque since the 17th Party 
Congress in 2007, is increasingly being institutionalized as the CPC's 
organizational approach to remain its 'authoritarian resilience' (Nathan 
2003: 6-17; Wang and Tan 2013: 199-219). With backroom straw polls 
setting new norms for the CPC to settle factional inﬁghting over power 
transfer at the 18th Party Congress, such 'intra-Party democracy' pro-
cedures have been gradually routinized at both the central and local 
levels to make the appointment process more consultative and to fend 
off democratic outcries from the public. The weaker the incumbent 
leader, the more likely he/she is to rely on 'collective decision-making' 
(jiti juece) when appointing a successor. In the past few years, cautious 
but substantial experiments of contested polls have been introduced 
by CPC's organizational departments to the monolithic political sys-
tem, in which key party/government ofﬁcials are facing increasingly 
competitive voting tests before they can be promoted to higher levels. 
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The development of intra-party democracy still faces uncertainty given 
Xi's consolidated authority after the CPC's Third Plenum in November 
2013, but Xi's power is not absolute and is still constrained by embed-
ded formal and informal party institutions that prevent overwhelming 
domination of one faction, encourage factional accommodation and thus 
reduce destructive power struggles. He may be more powerful than his 
two predecessors in deciding his heir apparent, but on other key posi-
tions in the Politburo Standing Committee, he still has to seek consensus 
with other party elders, and on some occasions, they will have to resort 
to informal polls. On the selection of key ofﬁcials at various levels below 
the Politburo, the top leadership, considering the magnitude of China's 
multi-layer bureaucratic system and economic scale, as well as more 
conspicuous inner-Party pluralism and factional politics, still needs to 
rely on closed-door consultation and contested polling.
Certain informal rules based on balance of power among different 
factions and restriction of incumbent leaders' power have emerged in 
China's elite politics, which restricts the top leader's power in handpick-
ing his protégé as the future successor. Instead, the heir apparent will 
continue to be an outcome of compromises among different groups, 
or even one step further, the result of polls in a limited sense. Never-
theless, since no explicit rules have been established with regard to 
the opaque selection process, a polling mechanism is very fragile and 
prone to political manipulation, facing the risk of triggering disruptive 
political strife at the top. On some occasions, this way of producing 
future leadership guarantees policy continuation and stability while 
forestalling individual dictatorship and corruption, but without the 
full-ﬂedged development of intra-party democracy institutions, the 
CPC will inevitably encounter great uncertainty and risks in dealing 
with power succession, a source of inordinate concern and outbursts 
of concentrated strife in its history. The opaque process by which the 
CPC decides its future leadership prevents the democratization proce-
dure from being duplicated in other political realms. There is also no 
institutional guarantee that extensive interest of different social groups 
will be co-opted by future leadership, since lobbying activities could 
not work well in such a non-transparent process that lacks clear policy 
debates among potential candidates.
Chen Gang is a Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University 
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NOTES
1  Cheng Li (Brookings Institution, USA), who has done pioneering research on this 
topic, discussed the dichotomous views over the implications of China's 'intra-Party 
democracy' (Li 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013). Other research on a similar topic includes 
Lin (2004: 255-275); Thornton (2008: 2-22); Zheng and Chen (2009: 1-30). 
2  Liu Siyang, Sun Chengbin, and Liu Gang, 2007, 'For the Prosperity and Stability of 
the Party and State: On the Spot Record of the Birth of the New Party Leadership' 
(Weile dang he guojia xingwang fada changzhi jiuan — dang de xin yijie zhongyang lingdao 
jigou chansheng jishi)', Xinhua News, 23 October.
3  Xinhua News, 23 October 2007
4  The ﬁve criteria are: 1) the age of the candidates range from 45 to 55 years old; 2) 
the candidates and their family members should be incorruptible; 3) the candidates 
have undergone tests in their political careers and found to have ﬁrmly adhered to 
the policies formulated by the 15th and 16th Party Congress; 4) the candidates have 
aspirations for the country's future; 5) the candidates can be accepted within and 
outside the CPC. See Dong Xiang (2008: 6–7).
5  People's Daily, 2011, 'Jiangsu for the ﬁrst time selected three municipal party secre-
taries through open recommendations and balloting' (Jiangsu shouci gongtuipiaojue 
chansheng sanming shiweishuji), 19 April. Available at: http://renshi.people.com.
cn/GB/14422048.html (accessed 2 January 2014). 
6  China Daily, 2004, 'Direct Elections Move to Township Level', 18 May. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-05/18/content_331594.htm 
(accessed 12 December 2013). 
7   In an early model for further experiments on direct township election, all registered 
voters in Dapeng Town in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, were allowed to par-
ticipate in a form of sea election (haixuan, where any adult in the constituency can 
be a candidate in the election) to nominate candidates for town magistrate in 1999. 
Voters representing about one-ﬁfth of the town's population and selected by the 
election organizing committee from among local ofﬁcials, Party members, village 
committee members, villager-small-group chiefs, town resident committee members, 
and representatives of enterprises and unions, then voted for one among the ﬁve 
qualiﬁed candidates who received more than 100 votes on the ﬁrst ballot, in what 
was called an 'opinion poll'. The winning candidate's name was then submitted to 
the township people's congress for a conﬁrming vote. See Horsley (2001).  
8  The term 'semi-competitive elections' is used because these elections are far from 
being free and competitive elections as one sees in many countries. 
9  China Daily, 2010, 'Bribery being Bred in Grassroot Elections', 22 July. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/22/content_11033296.htm   (ac-
cessed 13 December 2013). 
10   There have been occasional reports recently about intra-party elections for county-
level party secretaries. See, for example, Xinhua News, 2011, 'CCP Tries to Push 
Political Elites onto Election Stage' (zhonggong changshi tuidong zhizheng zhiguo 
guganliliang zoushang jingxuan wutai), 12 June.
11  People's Daily 2010.  'Wang Yukai urges direct election of county leaders' (wangyu-
kai: tuijin xianjizhixuan), 19 December. Available at: http://theory.people.com.
cn/GB/11721480.html (accessed 14 December 2013). 
12  Xinhua News, 2012, '18th CPC Central Committee elected with a 9.3% margin' (shibajie 
zhongyang weiyuanhui weiyuan xuanju cha'e bili wei 9.3%), 14 November.
13  People's Daily, 2004, 'Zeng Qinghong: A pivotal document on enhancement of CCP's 
ruling capacity' (zeng qinghong: jiaqiang dangde zhizhengnengli jianshe de ganglingxing 
wenxian), 8 October, pp. 2-3.
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14  In 2000, Jiang Zemin raised a new concept of san ge dai biao (literally 'three represents'). 
According to this concept, the CPC represents the most advanced production mode, 
the most advanced culture, and the interests of the majority of the people.  
15  This is the main argument in Shambaugh (2008), McGregor (2010), and Brødsgaard 
and Zheng (2006).   
16  Since the early 1990s, Chinese leaders have tended to embark on anti-corruption 
campaigns in their ﬁrst year of ofﬁce to consolidate power and court the public. An 
unprecedented number of ofﬁcials at the vice-ministerial level and above have been 
investigated or detained under corruption charges after Xi Jinping came to power 
in 2012. Between November 2012 and June 2014, 30 incumbent senior ofﬁcials have 
been investigated by CPC's disciplinary inspection departments. In comparison, 
the average number of ofﬁcials at the vice-ministerial level and above investigated 
in Hu Jintao's second term (2008–2012) only reached six per annum.
17  China Daily, 2005, 'Ofﬁcial on trial for selling high-level jobs', 22 March. Available 
at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/22/content_427223.htm 
(accessed 11 November 2013). 
18  Xinhua News, 2011, 'CCP Tries to Push Political Elites onto Election Stage' (zhonggong 
changshi tuidong zhizheng zhiguo guganliliang zoushang jingxuan wutai), 12 June.
19  Liu Yunshan, the Party's propaganda chief, has working experience in the Youth 
League and is often regarded as the only 'Hu-ist' among the ﬁve newcomers. See The 
Economist, 2012, 'Changing guard: China shufﬂes its leadership, putting a princeling 
in command,' 17 November. However, he is also believed to have very close ties 
with Jiang Zemin. See Li (2013).
20  Under Deng Xiaoping, the CPC established the Central Advisory Commission in 
1982, which provided elderly Party leaders such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian with 
a formal channel to inﬂuence decision making of the Politburo Standing Committee. 
This institution was one of the major sources behind the power struggles that led 
to the fall of both Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. Fortunately, Deng 
disassembled this organization when he formally retired from politics. However, 
Deng and his senior colleagues continued to inﬂuence politics and policies through 
informal channels after that.
21  There are diverging views as to whether the Chinese political system has become 
more dynamic and responsive to external changes. Literature with pessimistic views 
includes Pei (2006), Shirk (2007) and Waldron (2002: 171-179).
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